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Multimedia IPP Codes with Efficient Tracing
Jing Jiang, Minquan Cheng, Ying Miao and Dianhua Wu
Abstract—Binary multimedia identifiable parent property
codes (binary t-MIPPCs) are used in multimedia fingerprinting
schemes where the identification of users taking part in the aver-
aging collusion attack to illegally redistribute content is required.
In this paper, we first introduce a binary strong multimedia
identifiable parent property code (binary t-SMIPPC) whose
tracing algorithm is more efficient than that of a binary t-MIPPC.
Then a composition construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from q-
ary t-SMIPPCs is provided. Several infinite series of optimal
q-ary t-SMIPPCs of length 2 with t = 2, 3 are derived from the
relationships among t-SMIPPCs and other fingerprinting codes,
such as t-separable codes and t-MIPPCs. Finally, combinatorial
properties of q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 are investigated, and
optimal q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 with q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6)
are constructed.
Index Terms—Difference matrix, multimedia fingerprinting,
separable code, strong multimedia identifiable parent property
code.
I. INTRODUCTION
COdes with the identifiable parent property (t-IPPCs) werefirst introduced by Hollmann et al. [11], motivated by
the purpose of protecting copyrighted digital contents, and
investigated in detail in [2], [3], [4], [14], [16]. Recently,
Cheng et al. [6] introduced a multimedia identifiable parent
property code (t-MIPPC) to resist the averaging collusion
attack on multimedia contents. They showed that binary t-
MIPPCs can be used in multimedia fingerprinting to identify,
as t-IPPCs do in the generic digital scenario [1], [11], at
least one such malicious authorized user when the size of the
coalition is at most t with computational complexity O(nM t),
where n is the code length and M is the number of codewords,
thereby bringing enough pressure to bear on authorized users
to give up their attempts at collusion. Obviously, the tracing
algorithm based on such a binary t-MIPPC is not efficient
for practical use. In this paper, we introduce a new notion
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of a strong multimedia identifiable parent property code (t-
SMIPPC) to resist the averaging attack on multimedia contents
in a fingerprinting system. We show that binary t-SMIPPCs
can be used in tracing algorithms to identify at least one
colluder when the size of the coalition is at most t with
computational complexity O(nM), which is clearly more
efficient than those based on binary t-MIPPCs.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we
briefly review the concepts of fingerprinting, collusion and
detection. In Section III, we introduce the notion of a strong
multimedia identifiable parent property code, and discuss the
tracing algorithm based on this new code. In Section IV,
several infinite series of optimal t-SMIPPCs of length 2 with
t = 2, 3 are derived. In Section V, optimal q-ary 2-SMIPPCs
of length 3 with q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6) are constructed.
Finally, conclusions will be given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a very brief review on some basic
terminologies. The interested reader is referred to [9], [13] for
more detailed information.
In collusion-resistant fingerprinting, we want to design
fingerprints which can be used to trace and identify colluders
after collusion attacks, together with robust embedding of
fingerprints into multimedia host signals. Spread-spectrum
additive embedding is one of the widely employed robust
embedding techniques. Let x be the host multimedia signal,
{ui | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be an orthonormal basis of noise-like signals,
and {wj = (wj(1),wj(2), . . . ,wj(n)) =
∑n
i=1 bijui | 1 ≤
j ≤ M}, bij ∈ {0, 1}, be a family of scaled watermarks to
achieve the imperceptibility as well as to control the energy
of the embedded watermark. The watermarked version of the
content yj = x+wj , 1 ≤ j ≤M , is then assigned to the au-
thorized user Uj who has purchased the rights to access x. The
fingerprintwj assigned to Uj can be represented uniquely by a
vector (called codeword) bj = (b1j , b2j, . . . , bnj)T ∈ {0, 1}n
because of the linear independence of the basis {ui | 1 ≤ i ≤
n}.
When t authorized users, say Uj1 , Uj2 , . . . , Ujt , who have
the same host content but different fingerprints come together,
we assume that they have no way of manipulating the indi-
vidual orthonormal signals, that is, the underlying codeword
needs to be taken and proceeded as a single entity, but they
can carry on a linear collusion attack to generate a pirate copy
from their t fingerprinted contents, so that the venture traced
by the pirate copy can be attenuated. In additive embedding,
this is done by linearly combining the t fingerprinted contents∑t
l=1 λjlyjl , where the weights {λjl | 1 ≤ l ≤ t} satisfy the
condition
∑t
l=1 λjl = 1 to maintain the average intensity of
the original multimedia signal. In this case, the energy of each
2of the watermarks wjl is reduced by a factor of λ2jl , therefore,
the trace of Ujl’s fingerprint becomes weaker and thus Ujl
is less likely to be caught by the detector. Since normally
no colluder is willing to take more of a risk than any other
colluder, averaging attack in which λjl = 1/t, 1 ≤ l ≤ t,
is the most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection,
as claimed in [13], [15]. This attack also makes the pirate
copy have better perceptional quality. Based on the discussions
above, the observed content y after averaging attack is
y =
1
t
t∑
l=1
yjl =
1
t
t∑
l=1
wjl + x =
t∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
bijl
t
ui + x.
In colluder detection phase, we compute the correlation vec-
tor T = (T(1),T(2), . . . ,T(n)), where T(i) = 〈y − x,ui〉,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 〈y−x,ui〉 is the inner product of y−x and ui.
We would like to strategically design an anti-collusion code
to accurately identify the contributing fingerprints involved in
the averaging attack from this detection statistics T.
III. STRONG MULTIMEDIA IDENTIFIABLE PARENT
PROPERTY CODES
In this section, we first introduce the notion of a strong
multimedia identifiable parent property code (t-SMIPPC), and
then discuss the tracing algorithm based on binary SMIPPCs.
A composition construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from q-ary
t-SMIPPCs is also presented.
Let n,M and q be positive integers, and Q an alphabet
with |Q| = q. A set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} ⊆ Qn is called
an (n,M, q) code and each ci is called a codeword. Without
loss of generality, we may assume Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
When Q = {0, 1}, we also use the word “binary”. Given
an (n,M, q) code, its incidence matrix is the n ×M matrix
on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} in which the columns are the
M codewords in C. Often, we make no difference between
an (n,M, q) code and its incidence matrix unless otherwise
stated.
For any (n,M, q) code C on Q, we define the following
shortened code Aji for i ∈ Q and 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
Aji = {(c(1), . . . , c(j − 1), c(j + 1), . . . , c(n))
T |
(c(1), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C, c(j) = i}.
For any code C ⊆ Qn, we define the set of ith coordinates
of C as
C(i) = {c(i) ∈ Q | c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C}
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For any subset of codewords C′ ⊆ C, we
define the descendant code of C′ as
desc(C
′
) = {(x(1),x(2), . . . ,x(n))T ∈ Qn |
x(i) ∈ C
′
(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
that is,
desc(C
′
) = C
′
(1)× C
′
(2)× · · · × C
′
(n).
The set desc(C′) consists of the n-tuples that could be pro-
duced by a coalition holding the codewords in C′ .
Using the notions of descendant codes and sets of ith
coordinates of codes, Cheng et al. [6] defined multimedia
identifiable parent property codes (MIPPCs) and discussed the
tracing algorithm based on binary MIPPCs.
Definition III.1. Let C be an (n,M, q) code, and for any
R ⊆ C(1)×C(2)× · · · × C(n), define the set of parent sets of
R as
Pt(R) = {C
′
⊆ C | |C
′
| ≤ t, desc(C
′
) = R}.
We say that C is a code with the identifiable parent property
(IPP) for multimedia fingerprinting, or a multimedia IPP code,
denoted t-MIPPC(n,M, q), if ⋂
C
′
∈Pt(R)
C
′
6= ∅ is satisfied
for any R ⊆ C(1)× C(2)× · · · × C(n) with Pt(R) 6= ∅.
The notion of a binary MIPPC was introduced in [6] for
protecting multimedia contents, which, with code modulation,
can be used to construct families of fingerprints with the
ability to survive collusion and trace colluders. In fact, in
the multimedia scenario, for any set of colluders holding
codewords C0 ⊆ C and for any index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, their
detection statistics T(i) mentioned in Section II possesses the
whole information on C0(i), namely, we have T(i) = 1 if and
only if C0(i) = {1}, T(i) = 0 if and only if C0(i) = {0}, and
0 < T(i) < 1 if and only if C0(i) = {0, 1}. Therefore, we can
capture a set R = C0(1)× · · ·× C0(n) ⊆ C(1)× · · ·× C(n) in
the multimedia scenario from the detection statistics T. The
property an MIPPC holds makes it easy to identify C0, and
thus the set of colluders holding C0 who have produced R.
Theorem III.2. ([6]) Under the assumption that the number
of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-
MIPPC(n,M, 2) can be used to identify at least one colluder
with computational complexity O(nM t) by applying Algo-
rithm MIPPCTraceAlg(R) described in [6].
Algorithm 1: MIPPCTraceAlg(R)
Given R;
Find Pt(R) = {C
′
⊆ C | |C
′
| ≤ t, desc(C
′
) = R};
Compute C0 =
⋂
C
′
∈Pt(R)
C
′
;
if |C0| ≤ t then
output C0 as the set of colluders;
else
output “the set of colluders has size at least t+ 1”;
As we can see from the theorem above, the computational
complexity of the algorithm based on binary MIPPCs is not
efficient for practical use. Therefore, it is desirable to find
some special MIPPCs with efficient tracing ability.
Definition III.3. Let C be an (n,M, q) code, and t ≥ 2
be an integer. C is a strong multimedia identifiable parent
property code, or t-SMIPPC(n,M, q), if for any C0 ⊆ C,
1 ≤ |C0| ≤ t, we have
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, where S(C0) =
{C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C0)}.
The following is an equivalent definition of an SMIPPC.
3Definition III.4. Let C be an (n,M, q) code, and t ≥ 2 be
an integer. For any R ⊆ C(1) × · · · × C(n), define the set of
parent sets of R as
P(R) = {C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = R}.
We say C is a strong multimedia identifiable parent property
code, or t-SMIPPC(n,M, q), if ⋂
C
′
∈P(R) C
′
6= ∅ is satisfied
for all R ⊆ C(1)× · · · × C(n) with Pt(R) 6= ∅.
We can derive the following relationship immediately from
Definitions III.1 and III.4.
Lemma III.5. Any t-SMIPPC(n,M, q) is a t-MIPPC(n,M ,
q).
The following theorem shows that a t-SMIPPC(n,M, 2)
can be used to identify at least one colluder in the averaging
attack with computational complexity O(nM), which is more
efficient than that of a t-MIPPC(n,M, 2). We in fact use Algo-
rithm SSCTraceAlg(R) presented in [12]. For convenience,
the detailed illustration is given below.
Theorem III.6. Under the assumption that the number of
colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-
SMIPPC(n,M, 2) can be used to identify at least one colluder
with computational complexity O(nM) by applying Algorithm
SSCTraceAlg(R) described below.
Proof: Let C be the t-SMIPPC(n,M, 2), and R be the
descendant code derived from the detection statistics T. Then
by applying the following tracing algorithm, Algorithm 2,
one can identify at least one colluder. The computational
complexity is clearly O(nM).
According to Algorithm 2, by deleting all columns {c ∈
C | ∃ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,R(i) = {1}, c(i) = 0, or R(i) =
{0}, c(i) = 1}, we obtain a sub-matrix CL of C. Suppose
that C0 = {u1, u2, . . . , ur}, 1 ≤ r ≤ t, is the set of colluders,
the codeword ci is assigned to the colluder ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
and C0 = {c1, c2, . . . , cr}. It is not difficult to see that
C0 ⊆ CL. According to the definition of a t-SMIPPC, we
have
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, where S(C0) = {C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) =
desc(C0) = R}. We prove this theorem in three steps.
(1) CL ∈ S(C0), that is desc(CL) = R. For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
we consider the following cases.
(1.1) R(j) = {1}. For any c ∈ CL, c(j) = 1 according to
the processes deriving CL. So, CL(j) = {1} = R(j).
(1.2) R(j) = {0}. For any c ∈ CL, c(j) = 0 according to
the processes deriving CL. So, CL(j) = {0} = R(j).
(1.3) R(j) = {0, 1}. Since desc(C0) = R, we know that
there exist c1, c2 ∈ C0 ⊆ CL such that c1(j) = 0 and c2(j) =
1, respectively. This implies CL(j) = {0, 1} = R(j).
According to (1.1)-(1.3) above, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have
CL(j) = R(j), which implies desc(CL) = R.
(2) We want to show that for any x ∈ ⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, there
exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any
c ∈ CL\{x}, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1 for any c ∈ CL\{x}. If
this is not true, then for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, x(j) = 1 implies that
there exists c1 ∈ CL \ {x} such that c1(j) = 1, and x(j) = 0
implies that there exists c2 ∈ CL \ {x} such that c2(j) = 0.
Then we have desc(CL) = desc(CL \ {x}). Since CL ∈ S(C0)
Algorithm 2: SSCTraceAlg(R)
Define Ja, Jo to be the sets of indices where
R(j) = {1}, R(j) = {0}, respectively, and
Ja = (Ja(1), . . . ,Ja(|Ja|))T ,
Jo = (Jo(1), . . . ,Jo(|Jo|))
T to be the vector
representing R’s coordinates where R(j) = {1} and
R(j) = {0}, respectively;
Φ = 1;
Ua = ∅;
Uo = ∅;
U = ∅;
for k = 1 to |Ja| do
j = Ja(k);
define ej to be the jth row of C;
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for k = 1 to |Jo| do
j = Jo(k);
Φ = Φ · ej ;
for k = 1 to n do
Φa = Φ · ek;
Φo = Φ · ek;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φa(i) = 1 then
Ua = {i}
⋃
Ua;
if |Ua| = 1 then
U = U
⋃
Ua;
for i = 1 to M do
if Φo(i) = 1 then
Uo = {i}
⋃
Uo;
if |Uo| = 1 then
U = U
⋃
Uo;
if |U | ≤ t then
output U ;
else
output “The set of colluders has size at least t+ 1.”
by (1), we can have CL \ {x} ∈ S(C0), and x /∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
,
a contradiction.
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 2 and (2), it suffices
to show that any user u assigned with a codeword x ∈⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′ is a colluder. Assume that u is not a colluder.
Then for any C′ ∈ S(C0), we have C
′
\ {x} ∈ S(C0), which
implies x /∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, a contradiction.
The proof is then completed.
The following is a construction for binary t-SMIPPCs
from q-ary t-SMIPPCs, which makes the research of q-ary
t-SMIPPCs interesting.
Lemma III.7. If there exists a t-SMIPPC(n,M, q), then there
exists a t-SMIPPC(nq,M, 2).
Proof: Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cM} be a t-
SMIPPC(n,M, q) defined on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1},
and E = {e1, e2, . . . , eq}, where ei is the i-th column
4identity vector, i.e., all its coordinates are 0 except
the i-th one being 1. Let f : Q −→ E be the
bijective mapping such that f(i) = ei+1. For any
codeword c = (c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n))T ∈ C, we define
f(c) = (f(c(1)), f(c(2)), . . . , f(c(n)))T . Obviously, f(c)
is a binary column vector of length nq. We define a new
(nq,M, 2) code F = {f(c1), f(c2), . . . , f(cM )}, and show
that F is in fact a t-SMIPPC.
Consider any F0 ⊆ F with |F0| ≤ t, and S(F0) = {F
′
⊆
F | desc(F
′
) = desc(F0)} = {F0,F1, . . . ,Fr}. Each Fi
corresponds to a subcode Ci ⊆ C such that |Ci| = |Fi|, where
Fi = {f(c) | c ∈ Ci}. Since desc(F0) = desc(F1) = · · · =
desc(Fr), we immediately have desc(C0) = desc(C1) = · · · =
desc(Cr). Since C is a t-SMIPPC(n,M, q) and |C0| = |F0| ≤
t, we have
⋂r
i=0 Ci 6= ∅. Let c ∈
⋂r
i=0 Ci, then c ∈ Ci for any
0 ≤ i ≤ r, which implies f(c) ∈ Fi for any 0 ≤ i ≤ r, and
thus f(c) ∈
⋂r
i=0 Fi. Therefore,
⋂r
i=0 Fi 6= ∅. This completes
the proof.
IV. OPTIMAL t-SMIPPC(2,M, q)S WITH SMALL t
Let MSMIPPC(t, n, q) = max{M | there exists a t-
SMIPPC(n,M, q)}. A t-SMIPPC(n,M, q) is said to be op-
timal if M = MSMIPPC(t, n, q). Similarly, we can define
MMIPPC(t, n, q) = max{M | there exists a t-MIPPC(n,
M, q)} and optimal t-MIPPC(n,M, q)s. In this section, We
establish two equivalences in Corollary IV.5 and Theorem
IV.7, respectively. Based on these two relationships and the
known results in Lemmas IV.2 and IV.8, several infinite series
of optimal t-SMIPPC(2,M, q)s with t = 2, 3 are derived.
Separable codes (t-SCs) defined as follows were well stud-
ied in [7], [8], [9].
Definition IV.1. ([9]) Let C be an (n,M, q) code and t ≥ 2
be an integer. C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n,M, q), if for
any C1, C2 ⊆ C such that 1 ≤ |C1| ≤ t, 1 ≤ |C2| ≤ t and
C1 6= C2, we have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2).
Similar to MSMIPPC(t, n, q) and optimal t-SMIPPC(n,
M, q)s, we can define MSC(t, n, q) = max{M | there
exists a t-SC(n,M, q)} and optimal t-SC(n,M, q)s. The fol-
lowing optimal SCs come from [7], [8].
Lemma IV.2. ([7], [8]) Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then
there is an optimal 2-SC(2,M, q) for any q ∈ {k2 − 1, k2 +
k − 2, k2 + k − 1, k2 + k, k2 + k + 1}.
The following result will be used to obtain the equivalence
between a 2-SMIPPC(2,M, q) and a 2-SC(2,M, q).
Theorem IV.3. ([6]) Let C be an (n,M, q) code. Then C is a
2-MIPPC(n,M, q) if and only if it is a 2-SC(n,M, q).
Theorem IV.4. Let C be a (2,M, q) code. Then C is a 2-
SMIPPC(2,M, q) if and only if it is a 2-MIPPC(2,M, q).
Proof: According to Lemma III.5, it suffices to consider
the sufficiency. Let C be a 2-MIPPC(2,M, q), which implies
that C is a 2-SC(2,M, q) from Theorem IV.3. Assume that
C is not a 2-SMIPPC(2,M, q). Then there exists C0 ⊆ C,
1 ≤ |C0| ≤ 2, such that
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= ∅, where S(C0) =
{C
′
⊆ C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C0)}. If |C0| = 1, then it is clear
that S(C0) = {C0}, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0 6= ∅, a
contradiction. So |C0| = 2. Let C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi)T ,
where i = 1, 2. Obviously, for any C′ ∈ S(C0), we have
C
′
⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C. We now consider the Hamming distance
d(c1, c2) of c1 and c2.
(1) If d(c1, c2) = 1, we may assume a1 = a2, b1 6=
b2. We can easily see that S(C0) = {C0}, which implies⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0 6= ∅, a contradiction. So this case is
impossible.
(2) If d(c1, c2) = 2, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and desc(C0) =
{c1, c2, c3, c4}, where c3 = (a1, b2)T and c4 = (a2, b1)T .
Then |desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3. Otherwise, if |desc(C0)
⋂
C| = 4,
i.e., desc(C0)
⋂
C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}, then desc({c1, c2}) =
desc({c3, c4}), a contradiction to the fact that C is a 2-SC.
Since C is a 2-SC(2,M, q), for any C′ ∈ S(C0), C
′
6= C0, we
have |C′ | ≥ 3. Together with the facts C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C and
|desc(C0)
⋂
C| ≤ 3, one can derive C′ = desc(C0)
⋂
C. Hence
C0 ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C = C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0 6=
∅, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
The proof is then completed.
The following result comes from Theorems IV.3 and IV.4.
Corollary IV.5. Let C be an (n,M, q) code. Then C is a 2-
SMIPPC(2,M, q) if and only if it is a 2-SC(2,M, q).
F
Thus, according to Lemma IV.2 and Corollary IV.5, one can
obtain optimal 2-SMIPPC(2,M, q)s.
Corollary IV.6. Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is
an optimal 2-SMIPPC(2,M, q) for any q ∈ {k2− 1, k2+ k−
2, k2 + k − 1, k2 + k, k2 + k + 1}.
Similarly, we also find an equivalence between a 3-
SMIPPC(2,M, q) and a 3-MIPPC(2,M, q) as follows.
Theorem IV.7. Let C be an (2,M, q) code. Then C is a 3-
SMIPPC(2,M, q) if and only if it is a 3-MIPPC(2,M, q).
Proof: By Lemma III.5, it suffices to consider the suf-
ficiency. Suppose that C is a 3-MIPPC(2,M, q). Then C
is also a 2-MIPPC(2,M, q), which implies that C is a 2-
SMIPPC(2,M, q) from Theorem IV.4. Assume that C is not a
3-SMIPPC(2,M, q). Then there exists C0 ⊆ C, 1 ≤ |C0| ≤
3, such that
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= ∅, where S(C0) = {C
′
⊆
C | desc(C
′
) = desc(C0)}. Obviously, for any C
′
∈ S(C0), we
have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Then, at least one of the following
cases should occur. However, we can prove none of them is
possible.
(1) 1 ≤ |C0| ≤ 2. Since C is a 2-SMIPPC(2,M, q),⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(2) If |C0| = 3, then let C0 = {c1, c2, c3}, where ci =
(ai, bi)
T
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
(2.1) If a1 = a2 = a3, then bi 6= bj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3. We can
easily see that S(C0) = {C0}, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
=
C0 6= ∅, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(2.2) If a1 = a2 6= a3, then b1 6= b2. Let C1 =
(desc(C0)
⋂
C)\C0. Then b1 /∈ C1(2) or b2 /∈ C1(2). Otherwise,
b1, b2 ∈ C1(2), which implies that (a3, b1)T , (a3, b2)T ∈ C.
Then we have desc({c1, (a3, b2)T }) = desc({c2, (a3, b1)T }),
5and {c1, (a3, b2)T }
⋂
{c2, (a3, b1)T } = ∅, a contradiction to
the definition of a 3-MIPPC.
(2.2.A) If b1 /∈ C1(2), then c1 is the only codeword such that
c1 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C and c1(2) = b1. Since C
′
⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C,
we should have c1 ∈ C
′ for any C′ ∈ S(C0). Otherwise, if
c1 /∈ C
′
, then b1 /∈ C
′
(2), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0)
as b1 ∈ C0(2), a contradiction. So, in this case, c1 ∈⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, a contradiction
to the assumption. So this case is impossible.
(2.2.B) If b2 /∈ C1(2), similar to (2.2.A), we can have c2 ∈⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, a contradiction
to the assumption. So this case is impossible.
(2.3) If ai 6= aj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, we only need to consider
the case bi 6= bj , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, since we can consider the
other two cases in a similar way with (2.1) and (2.2). In this
case, we have
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9
desc(C0) =
(
a1 a2 a3 a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3
b1 b2 b3 b2 b3 b1 b3 b1 b2
)
If desc(C0)
⋂
C = C0, we can check that for any C
′
∈ S(C0),
C
′
⊆ desc(C
′
)
⋂
C = desc(C0)
⋂
C = C0, then |C
′
| ≤
|C0| = 3, and hence
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅ since C is a 3-
MIPPC, a contradiction to the assumption. So desc(C0)
⋂
C
contains at least one of the words c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9. With-
out loss of generality, we only need to consider the case
c4 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Then c6 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C, otherwise,
desc({c1, c2}) = desc({c4, c6}), and {c1, c2}
⋂
{c4, c6} = ∅,
a contradiction to the definition of a 3-MIPPC. We will
show that c7, c8 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. If c7 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C (or
c8 /∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C), then for any C′ ∈ S(C0), we have c2 ∈ C
′
(or c1 ∈ C′), otherwise, a2 /∈ C′(1) (or b1 /∈ C′(2)), which
implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0) since a2 ∈ C0(1) (or b1 ∈ C0(2)).
Hence c2 ∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′ (or c1 ∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′), which
implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅, a contradiction to the assumption.
So, c4, c7, c8 ∈ desc(C0)
⋂
C. Then desc({c1, c2, c3}) =
desc({c4, c7, c8}), while {c1, c2, c3}
⋂
{c4, c7, c8} = ∅, a
contradiction to the definition of a 3-MIPPC. So this case is
impossible.
The proof is then completed.
The above theorem shows that the following optimal 3-
MIPPCs of length 2 are in fact optimal 3-SMIPPCs of length
2.
Lemma IV.8. ([6]) There exists an optimal 3-MIPPC(2, (k2+
1)(k + 1)2, (k2 + 1)(k + 1)) for any prime power k.
Corollary IV.9. There exists an optimal 3-SMIPPC(2, (k2 +
1)(k + 1)2, (k2 + 1)(k + 1)) for any prime power k.
V. 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q)
In this section, we will investigate the combinatorial
properties of a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q), and then derive for-
bidden configurations of a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q). Optimal 2-
SMIPPC(3,M, q)s are also constructed for each q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5
(mod 6).
A. General idea
At first, one can easily derive the following result from
Lemma III.5 and Theorem IV.3.
Corollary V.1. Any 2-SMIPPC(n,M, q) is a 2-SC(n,M, q).
Thus, MSMIPPC(2, n, q) ≤ MSC(2, n, q), and we can
investigate 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q)s based on 2-SC(3,M, q)s.
Lemma V.2. ([8]) A (3,M, q) code is a 2-SC(3,M, q) on Q
if and only if |Ajg1
⋂
Ajg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive integers
1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Q.
Lemma V.3. ([8]) For any 2-SC(3,M, q), we have M ≤ q2+
q(q−1)
2 .
Then an upper bound on the size of a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q)
can be derived by Corollary V.1 and Lemma V.3.
Theorem V.4. For any 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q), we have M ≤
q2 + q(q−1)2 .
Next, we try to find out forbidden configurations of a 2-
SMIPPC(3,M, q).
Lemma V.5. ([12]) Let C be a 2-SC(3,M, q). If there exist
C0, C
′
⊆ C, |C0| ≤ 2, such that desc(C0) = desc(C
′
) and
C0 6⊆ C
′
, then desc(C0)
⋂
C is of one of the following four
types:
Type I: Type II:
 a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1

 ,
Type III: Type IV:
 a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b2 b1
e1 e2 e1 e1

 ,

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1

 ,
where C0 = {c1, c2}, ci = (ai, bi, ei), i = 1, 2, and a1 6= a2,
b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2.
Theorem V.6. Let C be a 2-SC(3,M, q). Then C is a 2-
SMIPPC(3,M, q) if and only if for any C0 = {c1, c2} =
{(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2,
and e1 6= e2, we have desc(C0)
⋂
C is not of type IV of Lemma
V.5: 
 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1


Proof: Suppose that C is a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q). If there
exists C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C,
where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C
is of type IV, then we can derive that desc({c1, c2}) =
desc({(a1, b1, e2)T , (a1, b2, e1)T , (a2, b1, e1)T }), while
{c1, c2}
⋂
{(a1, b1, e2)T , (a1, b2, e1)T ,
(a2, b1, e1)
T } = ∅, a contradiction to the definition of a
2-SMIPPC.
Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3,M, q), and for any
C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C, where
a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have desc(C0)
⋂
C is not
of type IV. We will show
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅
6(1) If for any C′ ∈ S(C0), we have C0 ⊆ C′ , then⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
= C0 6= ∅.
(2) If there exists C′′ ∈ S(C0) such that C0 6⊆ C′′ , then by
Lemma V.5, we know that desc(C0)
⋂
C is of one of the four
types mentioned in Lemma V.5. Since desc(C0)
⋂
C is not of
type IV, we know that desc(C0)
⋂
C is of one of the types I,
II, III.
(2.1) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type I, then for any C′ ∈ S(C0),
we have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C, and thus c2 ∈ C
′
, otherwise, a2 /∈
C
′
(1), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0), a contradiction. So
we have c2 ∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅.
(2.2) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type II, then for any C′ ∈ S(C0),
we have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C, and thus c2 ∈ C
′
, otherwise, b2 /∈
C
′
(2), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0), a contradiction. So
we have c2 ∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅.
(2.3) If desc(C0)
⋂
C is of type III, then for any C′ ∈ S(C0),
we have C′ ⊆ desc(C0)
⋂
C, and thus c2 ∈ C
′
, otherwise, e2 /∈
C
′
(3), which implies desc(C′) 6= desc(C0), a contradiction. So
we have c2 ∈
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
, which implies
⋂
C
′
∈S(C0)
C
′
6= ∅.
Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q).
To construct 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q)s, a cyclic difference ma-
trix is needed.
Definition V.7. A cyclic difference matrix (q, k, 1)-CDM is a
k × q matrix D = (dij) with dij ∈ Zq such that for any
1 ≤ i1 6= i2 ≤ k, the differences di1j − di2j , 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
comprise all the elements of Zq.
Similar to [8], suppose that there exists a (q, 3, 1)-CDM D.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that
D =

 0 0 · · · 00 1 · · · q − 1
x0 x1 · · · xq−1

 . (i)
Let S be a 3× w matrix on Zq as follows.
S =

 0 0 · · · 0s1 s2 · · · sw
t1 t2 · · · tw

 . (ii)
Let
CD = {c+ g | c ∈ D, g ∈ Zq},
CS = {c+ g | c ∈ S, g ∈ Zq}, C = CD
⋃
CS . (iii)
Theorem V.8. ([8]) Suppose that D is a (q, 3, 1)-CDM in
the form (i) and S is a 3 × w matrix in the form (ii),
where |{s1, s2, . . . , sw}| = |{t1, t2, . . . , tw}| = |{t1− s1, t2−
s2, . . . , tw−sw}| = w. Then, the following two statements are
equivalent:
(1) C in the form (iii) is a 2-SC(3, q(q + w), q);
(2) For any two columns (0, si, ti)T and (0, sj , tj)T in S,
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ w, suppose (0, y, xy)T , (0, z, xz)T ,
(0, yi, xyi)
T
, (0, yj, xyj )
T
, (0, zi, xzi)
T
, (0, zj, xzj )
T ∈
D, where y, z, yi, yj , zi, zj ∈ Zq, such that

ti − si = xy − y,
tj − sj = xz − z,
ti = xyi ,
tj = xyj ,
si = zi,
sj = zj.
Then we have 0 /∈ {ti − xy , tj − xz , (ti − xy) ± (tj −
xz), si − yi, sj − yj , (si − yi)± (sj − yj), ti − xzi , tj −
xzj , (ti − xzi)± (tj − xzj )}.
Theorem V.9. Suppose that C is a 2-SC(3, q(q+w), q) in the
form (iii) on Zq, and E = {(y, xy) | y ∈ Zq}
⋃
{(si, ti) | 1 ≤
i ≤ w}. Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(3, q(q + w), q) provided that
the following hold:
(I) There do not exist distinct 1 ≤ i1, i2, i3 ≤ w and y ∈ Zq,
such that 

y = si1 ,
xy = ti2 ,
xy − y = ti3 − si3 ,
(si2 + ti3 − xy, ti1 + ti3 − xy) ∈ E.
(II) There do not exist distinct y1, y2, y3 ∈ Zq and 1 ≤ i ≤ w,
such that 

si = y1,
ti = xy2 ,
ti − si = xy3 − y3,
(y2 + xy3 − ti, xy1 + xy3 − ti) ∈ E.
Proof: It is not difficult to check that CD and CS
are codes with minimum distance 2. Assume that C is
not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem V.6, there exists
C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C, where
a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C is of
the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
⋂
C =

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1


For convenience, suppose that c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T , c4 =
(a1, b2, e1)
T
, c5 = (a2, b1, e1)
T
.
(1) If c1 ∈ CD, then c1 = (k, k + y, k + xy)T , where
k, y ∈ Zq, and c3 = (k, k + y, e2)T , c4 = (k, b2, k + xy)T ,
c5 = (a2, k + y, k + xy)
T
.
It is easy to see that a2 6= k. Since CD has minimum
distance 2, we have c3, c4, c5 ∈ CS . Then there exist
1 ≤ i1, i2, i3 ≤ w such that c3 = (k, k + si1 , k + ti1)T ,
c4 = (k, k + si2 , k + ti2)
T
, c5 = (a2, a2 + si3 , a2 + ti3)
T
.
Since CS has minimum distance 2 and c3, c4, c5 ∈ CS , we
have

si1 6= si2 ,
ti1 6= ti2 ,
k + ti1 6= a2 + ti3(k + si1 = k + y = a2 + si3),
k + si2 6= a2 + si3(k + ti2 = k + xy = a2 + ti3).
7Obviously, i1 6= i2. We can also derive i1 6= i3, otherwise, if
i1 = i3, then k = a2, a contradiction. Similarly, i2 6= i3. So
i1, i2 and i3 are all distinct, and we have

k + y = k + si1 ,
e2 = k + ti1 ,
b2 = k + si2 ,
k + xy = k + ti2 ,
k + y = a2 + si3 ,
k + xy = a2 + ti3 .
⇒


y = si1 ,
xy = ti2 ,
xy − y = ti3 − si3 ,
a2 = k + xy − ti3 ,
b2 = k + si2 ,
e2 = k + ti1 .
Then c2 = (a2, b2, e2)T = (k + xy − ti3 , k + si2 , k + ti1)T .
(1.1) If c2 ∈ CD, then there exists z ∈ Zq such that c2 =
(k + xy − ti3 , k + xy − ti3 + z, k + xy − ti3 + xz)
T
. So we
have{
k + si2 = k + xy − ti3 + z,
k + ti1 = k + xy − ti3 + xz .
⇒
{
z = si2 + ti3 − xy,
xz = ti1 + ti3 − xy .
a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is impossible.
(1.2) If c2 ∈ CS , then there exists 1 ≤ i4 ≤ w such that
c2 = (k + xy − ti3 , k + xy − ti3 + si4 , k + xy − ti3 + ti4)
T
.
So we have{
k + si2 = k + xy − ti3 + si4 ,
k + ti1 = k + xy − ti3 + ti4 .
⇒
{
si4 = si2 + ti3 − xy,
ti4 = ti1 + ti3 − xy.
a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is impossible.
(2) If c1 ∈ CS , then c1 = (k, k + si, k + ti)T , where 1 ≤
i ≤ w, and c3 = (k, k + si, e2)T , c4 = (k, b2, k + ti)T ,
c5 = (a2, k + si, k + ti)
T
.
It is easy to see that a2 6= k. Since CS has minimum distance
2, we have c3, c4, c5 ∈ CD. Then there exist y1, y2, y3 ∈ Zq
such that c3 = (k, k+y1, k+xy1)T , c4 = (k, k+y2, k+xy2)T ,
c5 = (a2, a2+y3, a2+xy3)
T
. Since CD has minimum distance
2 and c3, c4, c5 ∈ CD, we have

y1 6= y2,
xy1 6= xy2 ,
k + xy1 6= a2 + xy3 (k + y1 = k + si = a2 + y3),
k + y2 6= a2 + y3 (k + xy2 = k + ti = a2 + xy3).
If y1 = y3, then k = a2, a contradiction. So, y1 6= y3 Similarly,
y2 6= y3. So y1, y2 and y3 are all distinct, and we have

k + si = k + y1,
e2 = k + xy1 ,
b2 = k + y2,
k + ti = k + xy2 ,
k + si = a2 + y3,
k + ti = a2 + xy3 .
⇒


si = y1,
ti = xy2 ,
ti − si = xy3 − y3,
a2 = k + ti − xy3 ,
b2 = k + y2,
e2 = k + xy1 .
Then c2 = (a2, b2, e2)T = (k + ti − xy3 , k + y2, k + xy1)T .
(2.1) If c2 ∈ CD, then there exists y4 ∈ Zq, such that
c2 = (k + ti − xy3 , k + ti − xy3 + y4, k + ti − xy3 + xy4)
T
.
So we can have{
k + y2 = k + ti − xy3 + y4,
k + xy1 = k + ti − xy3 + xy4 .
⇒
{
y4 = y2 + xy3 − ti,
xy4 = xy1 + xy3 − ti.
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible.
(2.2) If c2 ∈ CS , then there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ w, such that
c2 = (k+ ti − xy3 , k+ ti − xy3 + sj, k+ ti − xy3 + tj)
T
. So
we can have{
k + y2 = k + ti − xy3 + sj ,
k + xy1 = k + ti − xy3 + tj .
⇒
{
sj = y2 + xy3 − ti,
tj = xy1 + xy3 − ti.
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible.
Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3, q(q + w), q).
B. The case q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6)
We now consider the case q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6). To simplify
our discussion, let xi = 2i, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, sj1 6= sj2 , 1 ≤
j1 6= j2 ≤ w, tj = 3sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ w, in D in the form (i)
and S in the form (ii), respectively. Then we have two new
matrices:
D1 =

 0 0 · · · 00 1 · · · q − 1
0 2 · · · 2(q − 1)

 , (iv)
S1 =

 0 0 · · · 0s1 s2 · · · sw
3s1 3s2 · · · 3sw

 . (v)
Let
CD1 = {c+ g | c ∈ D1, g ∈ Zq},
CS1 = {c+ g | c ∈ S1, g ∈ Zq}, C1 = CD1
⋃
CS1 . (vi)
It is easy to check that D1 is a (q, 3, 1)-CDM. Let A1 =
{s1, s2, . . . , sw}, A2 = {2b | b ∈ A1}, and A3 = {−3b | b ∈
A1}. Then for any (a′, b′, e′)T ∈ CS1 , we can have b′ − a′ ∈
A1, e
′ − b′ ∈ A2, and a′ − e′ ∈ A3.
Theorem V.10. Suppose q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6). Then C1 in the
form (vi) is a 2-SC(3, q(q + w), q) on Zq provided that the
following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1 ≤ i ≤ w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1 ≤
i < j ≤ w.
Proof: We apply Theorem V.8. It is not difficult to
check that |{s1, s2, . . . , sw}| = |{3s1, 3s2, . . . , 3sw}| =
|{2s1, 2s2, . . . , 2sw}| = w from the fact q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
For any two columns (0, si, 3si)T and (0, sj, 3sj)T in S1,
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ w, suppose (0, y, 2y)T , (0, z, 2z)T ,
(0, yi, 2yi)
T
, (0, yj, 2yj)
T
, (0, zi, 2zi)
T
, (0, zj, 2zj)
T ∈ D1,
where y, z, yi, yj, zi, zj ∈ Zq , such that

2si = y,
2sj = z,
3si = 2yi,
3sj = 2yj,
si = zi,
sj = zj .
Then 3si − 2y = 3si − 4si = −si 6= 0,
3sj − 2z = 3sj − 4sj = −sj 6= 0,
(3si − 2y)± (3sj − 2z) = −(si ± sj) 6= 0,
si − yi = si −
3
2si = −
1
2si 6= 0,
8sj − yj = sj −
3
2sj = −
1
2sj 6= 0,
(si − yi)± (sj − yj) = −
1
2 (si ± sj) 6= 0,
3si − 2zi = 3si − 2si = si 6= 0,
3sj − 2zj = 3sj − 2sj = sj 6= 0,
(3si − 2zi)± (3sj − 2zj) = si ± sj 6= 0.
Then the conclusion comes from Theorem V.8.
Theorem V.11. Suppose that q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6). Then C1 in
the form (vi) is a 2-SMIPPC(3, q(q + w), q) on Zq provided
that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1 ≤ i ≤ w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers
1 ≤ i < j ≤ w.
(III) There does not exist an element b ∈ Zq such that
b, 2b3 ,
b
2 ∈ A1 = {s1, s2, . . . , sw} and 13b = 0.
Proof: According to Theorem V.10, we know that C1
is a 2-SC. Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC, then one of
conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem V.9 does not hold.
(1) Assume that condition (I) of Theorem V.9 does not hold.
Then there exist distinct 1 ≤ i1, i2, i3 ≤ w and y ∈ Zq such
that 

y = si1 ,
2y = 3si2 ,
y = 2si3 ,
(si2 + 3si3 − 2y, 3si1 + 3si3 − 2y) ∈ E.
⇒


y = si1 ,
2
3y = si2 ,
1
2y = si3 ,
(16y,
5
2y) ∈ E.
where E = {(y′, 2y′) | y′ ∈ Zq}
⋃
{(s′, 3s′) | s′ ∈ A1}.
This means that y, 2y3 ,
y
2 ∈ A1, and (
1
6y,
5
2y) ∈ E.
(1.1) If (16y,
5
2y) ∈ {(y
′, 2y′) | y′ ∈ Zq}, then 26y =
5
2y,
which implies 13y = 0, a contradiction to condition (III).
(1.2) If (16y,
5
2y) ∈ {(s
′, 3s′) | s′ ∈ A1}, then 36y =
5
2y,
which implies y = 0, a contradiction to 0 /∈ A1.
(2) Assume that condition (II) of Theorem V.9 does not
hold. Then there exist distinct y1, y2, y3 ∈ Zq and 1 ≤ i ≤ w
such that 

si = y1,
3si = 2y2,
2si = y3,
(y2 + 2y3 − 3si, 2y1 + 2y3 − 3si) ∈ E.
⇒


y1 = si,
2
3y2 = si,
1
2y3 = si,
(52si, 3si) ∈ E.
(2.1) If (52si, 3si) ∈ {(y
′, 2y′) | y′ ∈ Zq}, then 5si = 3si,
which implies si = 0, a contradiction to condition (I).
(2.2) If (52si, 3si) ∈ {(s
′, 3s′) | s′ ∈ A1}, then 152 si = 3si,
which implies si = 0, a contradiction to condition (I).
The above (1) and (2) show that conditions (I) and (II)
of Theorem V.9 always hold, which implies that C1 is a 2-
SMIPPC from Theorem V.9.
Now, we use Theorem V.11 to construct optimal 2-
SMIPPC(3,M, q)s for q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
Lemma V.12. If q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6) and q 6≡ 0 (mod 13), then
there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let C1 be in the form (vi) and A1 =
{1, 2, . . . , q−12 }. The conclusion comes from Theorem V.11.
Lemma V.13. If q ≡ 13, 65 (mod 78), then there exists a
2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let q = 13r. Suppose that C1 is in the form
(vi) and A1 = {1, . . . , 4r − 1, 4r + 1, . . . , q−12 , 9r}. We want
to show that conditions (I), (II), (III) in Theorem V.11 are
satisfied. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) hold. Assume that
there exists an element b ∈ Zq such that b, 2b3 ,
b
2 ∈ A1 and
13b = 0. Then b should be a multiple of r and thus we have
b ∈ {r, 2r, 3r, 5r, 6r, 9r}. Then
b r 2r 3r 5r 6r 9r
2b
3 5r 10r 2r 12r 4r 6r
b
2 7r r 8r 9r 3r 11r
Table 1
From Table 1, we know that for any b ∈ {r, 2r, 3r, 5r,
6r, 9r}, one of the elements 2b3 and
b
2 is not contained in
A1, a contradiction to b, 2b3 ,
b
2 ∈ A1. Hence, condition (III) is
satisfied.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem V.11.
Combining Theorem V.4, Lemmas V.12 and V.13, we have
Theorem V.14. There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 +
q(q−1)
2 , q) for any q ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
C. The case q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6)
Next, we deal with the case q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6). Let s = q−1,
then s ≡ 1, 5 (mod 6).
In order to describe our constructions, we introduce a new
element ∞ /∈ Zs, and for any a ∈ Zs, we define
a+∞ =∞+ a = a · ∞ =∞ · a =∞.
We now define a code
C
′
2 = C2
⋃
CT2
⋃
{(∞,∞,∞)T } (vii)
on Zs
⋃
{∞}, where s1, s2, . . . , sw,m ∈ Zs,
D2 =

 0 0 · · · 00 1 · · · s− 1
0 2 · · · 2(s− 1)

 ,
S2 =

 0 0 · · · 0s1 s2 · · · sw
3s1 3s2 · · · 3sw

 , (viii)
T2 =

 ∞ m 00 ∞ m
m 0 ∞

 ,
CD2 = {c+ g | c ∈ D2, g ∈ Zs}, CS2 = {c+ g | c ∈ S2, g ∈
Zs}, CT2 = {c+ g | c ∈ T2, g ∈ Zs}, and C2 = CD2
⋃
CS2 .
9Theorem V.15. C′2 in the form (vii) is a 2-SC(3, s(s + w +
3) + 1, q) provided that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1 ≤ i ≤ w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1 ≤
i < j ≤ w.
(III) m /∈ ⋃3i=1Ai.
Proof: According to Theorem V.10, we know that C2 =
CD2
⋃
CS2 is a 2-SC(3, s(s+w), s) defined on Zs. Hence, in
C2, |Ajg1
⋂
Ajg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
and any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Zs from Lemma V.2. Now we define
Bjg =


Ajg
⋃
{(∞, g −m)T , (g +m,∞)T }, if g ∈ Zs, j = 1, 3,
Ajg
⋃
{(∞, g +m)T , (g −m,∞)T }, if g ∈ Zs, j = 2,
{(i, i+m)T |i ∈ Zs}
⋃
{(∞,∞)T }, if g =∞, j = 1, 3,
{(i+m, i)T |i ∈ Zs}
⋃
{(∞,∞)T }, if g =∞, j = 2.
According to Lemma V.2, in order to prove that C′2 is a 2-SC,
it suffices to show that |Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive
integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Zs
⋃
{∞}.
Since for any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Zs, {(∞, g1 − m)T , (g1 +
m,∞)T }
⋂
{(∞, g2−m)T , (g2+m,∞)T } = ∅, and {(∞, g1+
m)T , (g1 −m,∞)T }
⋂
{(∞, g2 +m)T , (g2 −m,∞)T } = ∅,
we have Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 = A
j
g1
⋂
Ajg2 for any integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3,
which implies |Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 | ≤ 1.
Next, since m /∈
⋃3
i=1 Ai, we know that for any g ∈ Zs,
B1g
⋂
B1∞ = {(g +m, g + 2m)
T },
B2g
⋂
B2∞ = {(g +
m
2 , g −
m
2 )
T },
B3g
⋂
B3∞ = {(g − 2m, g −m)
T }.
Then |Bjg
⋂
Bj∞| = 1 holds for any integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
This completes the proof.
Theorem V.16. C′2 in the form (vii) is a 2-SMIPPC(3, s(s+
w + 3) + 1, q) provided that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1 ≤ i ≤ w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers
1 ≤ i < j ≤ w.
(III) There does not exist an element b ∈ Zs such that
b, 2b3 ,
b
2 ∈ A1 and 13b = 0.
(IV) m /∈ ⋃3i=1 Ai, −m2 /∈ A2, −2m /∈ A3, m 6= 0.
Proof: It is clear that C′2 is a 2-SC from Theorem V.15.
Assume that C′2 is not a 2-SMIPPC. According
to Theorem V.6, there exists C0 = {c1, c2} =
{(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C
′
2, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2,
and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2 is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2 =

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1


For convenience, suppose that c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T , c4 =
(a1, b2, e1)
T
, c5 = (a2, b1, e1)
T
.
(1) If c1 ∈ CD2 , then c1 = (k, k + b, k + 2b)T , where
k, b ∈ Zs.
(1.1) If b /∈ {m,−m2 }, then c3, c4, c5 ∈ C2 = CD2
⋃
CS2 ,
and also c2 ∈ C2. According to the proofs of Theorems V.9
and V.11, this case is impossible.
(1.2) If b = m, then c4 = (k, b2, k + 2m)T . Since s ≡ 1, 5
(mod 6) and m 6= 0, we have −2m 6= m, which implies
c4 /∈ CT2 . Since −2m /∈ A3, we can derive that c4 /∈ CS2 .
Hence c4 ∈ CD2 , which, together with the fact that CD2 has
minimum distance 2, implies c4 = c1, a contradiction. So this
case is impossible.
(1.3) If b = −m2 , then c5 = (a2, k− m2 , k−m)T . Since s ≡
1, 5 (mod 6) and m 6= 0, we have −m2 6= m, which implies
c5 /∈ CT2 . Since −m2 /∈ A2, we can derive that c5 /∈ CS2 .
Hence c5 ∈ CD2 , which implies c5 = c1, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
(2) If c1 ∈ CS2 , then c1 = (k, k + b, k + 3b)T , where
k ∈ Zs, b ∈ A1 ⊆ Zs. Since m /∈
⋃3
i=1 Ai, we know that
c3, c4, c5 /∈ CT2 , which implies c3, c4, c5 ∈ C2 = CD2
⋃
CS2 ,
and also c2 ∈ C2. According to the proofs of Theorems V.9
and V.11, this case is impossible.
(3) If c1 ∈ CT2 , without loss of generality, we may assume
that c1 = (∞, b, b +m)T . Then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
(4) If c1 = (∞,∞,∞)T , then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
According to (1)-(4), we know that C′2 is a 2-
SMIPPC(3, s(s+ w + 3) + 1, q).
Lemma V.17. If q ≡ 0 (mod 6) ≥ 12 and q 6≡ 1 (mod 13),
then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 = {1, 2, . . . , s−12 },
and m = −2. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem
V.16 are satisfied. Since q 6≡ 1 (mod 13), s = q − 1 6≡ 0
(mod 13). Then, except the element 0 ∈ Zs, there is no
element b ∈ Zs, such that 13b = 0, but 0 /∈ A1. This
implies that condition (III) of Theorem V.16 is satisfied. Now
consider condition (IV) of Theorem V.16. Remember that
A2 = {2b | b ∈ A1}, A3 = {−3b | b ∈ A1}.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and −m2 = 1 /∈ A2.(2) −2m = 4 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1,
such that 4 = −3b. Then b = − 43 . Since s = q − 1 ≡ 5
(mod 6), we write s = 6h+ 5 for some integer h ≥ 1. Then
b = 4h+2 and A1 = {1, 2, . . . , 3h+2}, which implies b /∈ A1,
a contradiction.
(3) Obviously, m = −2 /∈ A1
⋃
A2. It suffices to show that
m = −2 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1, such
that −2 = −3b. Then b = 23 = 4h+4, which implies b /∈ A1,
a contradiction.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem V.16.
Lemma V.18. If q ≡ 66 (mod 78), then there exists a 2-
SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let s = q−1 = 13r, C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 =
{1, . . . , 4r−1, 4r+1, . . . , s−12 , 9r}, and m = −2. Obviously,
conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem V.16 are satisfied. Since q ≡
66 (mod 78), s = q − 1 ≡ 65 (mod 78), then we can know
condition (III) of Theorem V.16 is satisfied from the proof of
Lemma V.13. Now consider condition (IV) of Theorem V.16.
Remember that A2 = {2b | b ∈ A1}, A3 = {−3b | b ∈ A1}.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and −m2 = 1 /∈ A2.(2) −2m = 4 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1,
such that 4 = −3b. Write s = 78h+65. Then r = 6h+5 and
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b = − 43 = 52h + 42. Since
s−1
2 = 39h + 32, it should hold
that b = 9r, that is, 2h+ 3 = 0, which is impossible.
(3) Since s ≥ 65, we have r ≥ 5. Then s−2 = 13r−2 > 9r,
which implies m = −2 /∈ A1. Also, s − 2 = 13r − 2 6= 5r,
which implies m = −2 /∈ A2. It suffices to show that m =
−2 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1, such that
−2 = −3b. Then b = 23 = 52h+ 44. Since
s−1
2 = 39h+ 32,
it should hold that b = 9r, that is, 2h + 1 = 0, which is
impossible.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem V.16.
Lemma V.19. If q ≡ 2 (mod 6) ≥ 44 and q 6≡ 1 (mod 13),
then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 = {1, 2, . . . , s−12 },
and m = −10. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem
V.16 are satisfied. Since q 6≡ 1 (mod 13), s = q − 1 6≡ 0
(mod 13). Then, except the element 0 ∈ Zs, there is no
element b ∈ Zs, such that 13b = 0, but 0 /∈ A1. This
implies that condition (III) of Theorem V.16 is satisfied. Now
consider condition (IV) of Theorem V.16. Remember that
A2 = {2b | b ∈ A1}, A3 = {−3b | b ∈ A1}.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and −m2 = 5 /∈ A2.
(2) −2m = 20 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1,
such that 20 = −3b. Then b = − 203 . Write s = 6h + 1 for
some integer h ≥ 7. Then b = 4h−6 and A1 = {1, 2, . . . , 3h},
which implies b /∈ A1, a contradiction.
(3) Since s ≥ 43, we have s− 10 = 6h− 9, and s−12 = 3h,
which implies m = −10 /∈ A1. It is also clear that m = −10 /∈
A2. We show that m = −10 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there
exists b ∈ A1, such that −10 = −3b. Then b = 103 = 4h+ 4,
which implies b /∈ A1, a contradiction.
So, the conclusion comes from Theorem V.16.
Lemma V.20. If q ≡ 14 (mod 78) ≥ 92, then there exists a
2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q).
Proof: Let s = q−1 = 13r, C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 =
{1, . . . , 4r−1, 4r+1, . . . , s−12 , 9r}, and m = −10. Obviously,
conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem V.16 are satisfied. Since
q ≡ 14 (mod 78), s = q − 1 ≡ 13 (mod 78), then we can
know that condition (III) of Theorem V.16 is satisfied from
the proof of Lemma V.13. Now we consider condition (IV) of
Theorem V.16.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and −m2 = 5 /∈ A2.
(2) −2m = 20 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1,
such that 20 = −3b. Write s = 78h+ 13. Then r = 6h + 1,
and b = − 203 = 52h+2. Since
s−1
2 = 39h+6, it should hold
that b = 9r, that is, 2h+ 7 = 0, which is impossible.
(3) Since s ≥ 91, we can have r ≥ 7. Then s − 10 =
13r − 10 > 9r, which implies m = −10 /∈ A1.
m = −10 /∈ A2. Assume not. Then there exists b ∈ A1,
such that −10 = 2b, which implies b = −5 = s − 5. Since
s ≥ 91, we have s − 5 > s−12 , which implies b = 9r, that
is, −10 = 2 · 9r = 18r = 5r. Hence r = −2 = s − 2 ≡ 5
(mod 6), a contradiction.
It suffices to show that m = −10 /∈ A3. Assume not. Then
there exists b ∈ A1, such that −10 = −3b. Then b = 103 =
52h+ 12. Since s−12 = 39h+ 6, it should hold that b = 9r,
then −10 = −3 ·9r = −r, r ≡ 10 (mod s) ≡ 10 (mod 13r),
and r = 10 6≡ 1 (mod 6), a contradiction.
So the conclusion comes from Theorem V.16.
Lemma V.21. There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 + q(q−1)2 , q)for any q ∈ {20, 26, 32, 38}.
Proof: Let
A(20) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13}, m(20) = 9,
A(26) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13}, m(26) = 24,
A(32) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 15, 17}, m(32) = 21,
A(38) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 19} m(38) = 27.
For any q ∈ {20, 26, 32, 38}, let s = q−1, C(q) be in the form
(vii), A1 = A(q), and m = m(q). Then the conclusion comes
from Theorem V.16.
The following result comes from Lemmas V.17-V.21 and
Theorem V.4.
Theorem V.22. Suppose that q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6), and q /∈
{2, 6, 8, 14}, then there exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 +
q(q−1)
2 , q).
For each q ∈ {6, 8}, we want to find the set A1 and the
element m satisfying the conditions (I)-(IV) of Theorem V.16.
Unfortunately, we fail to do this. However, we can construct
a 2-SMIPPC(3, q2+ q(q−1)2 , q) for each q ∈ {6, 8} by making
a detailed analysis of the proof of Theorem V.16.
Lemma V.23. There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, 51, 6).
Proof: Let s = 5, C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 = {1, 2},
and m = 3. Then A2 = A3 = {2, 4}. It is not difficult to check
that m 6= 0, −m2 = 1 /∈ A2, m /∈
⋃3
i=1Ai, and conditions (I),
(II), (III) of Theorem V.16 are satisfied. According to the proof
of Theorem V.16, it suffices to prove the following assertion:
There does not exist C0 = {c1, c2} = {(k, k + 3, k + 1)T ,
(a2, b2, e2)
T } ⊆ C
′
2, where k ∈ Z5, a2, b2, e2 ∈ Z5
⋃
{∞},
a2 6= k, b2 6= k + 3, and e2 6= k + 1, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2
is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2 =

 k a2 k k a2k + 3 b2 k + 3 b2 k + 3
k + 1 e2 e2 k + 1 k + 1

 ,
where c3 = (k, k+3, e2)T , c4 = (k, b2, k+1)T , c5 = (a2, k+
3, k + 1)T .
Assume not. Obviously, c3, c4, c5 /∈ CD2 , because of the
fact that CD2 has minimum distance 2 and c1 ∈ CD2 . It is
not difficult to see that c3, c5 /∈ CS2 since 3 /∈ A1
⋃
A2,
which implies c3, c5 ∈ CT2 . Hence c3 = (k, k + 3,∞)T ,
c5 = (∞, k+3, k+1)T , and c2 = (∞,∞,∞)T , which implies
c4 = (k,∞, k + 1)T . Clearly, since m = 3 6= −1, we know
that c4 = (k,∞, k + 1)T /∈ C
′
2, a contradiction.
So, C′2 is a 2-SMIPPC(3, 51, 6).
Lemma V.24. There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, 92, 8).
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Proof: Let s = 7, C′2 be in the form (vii), A1 = {1, 2, 4},
and m = 3. Then A2 = A3 = {1, 2, 4}. It is not difficult
to check that m 6= 0, m /∈
⋃3
i=1 Ai and conditions (I), (II),
(III) of Theorem V.16 are satisfied. According to the proof of
Theorem V.16, it suffices to prove the following assertion:
There does not exist C0 = {c1, c2} = {(k, k + b, k +
2b)T , (a2, b2, e2)
T } ⊆ C
′
2, where k ∈ Z7, b ∈ {2, 3},
a2, b2, e2 ∈ Z7
⋃
{∞}, a2 6= k, b2 6= k + b, and e2 6= k + 2b,
such that desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2 is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
2 =

 k a2 k k a2k + b b2 k + b b2 k + b
k + 2b e2 e2 k + 2b k + 2b

 ,
where c3 = (k, k + b, e2)T , c4 = (k, b2, k + 2b)T , c5 =
(a2, k + b, k + 2b)
T
.
Assume not. Since CD2 has minimum distance 2 and c1 ∈
CD2 , we know that c3, c4, c5 /∈ CD2 .
(1) The case b = 2. We can directly check that c3, c5 /∈ CT2
and c4 /∈ CS2 , which implies c3, c5 ∈ CS2 and c4 ∈ CT2 .
Hence c3 = (k, k+2, k+6)T , c5 = (k+1, k+2, k+4)T and
c4 = (k,∞, k+4)
T
, which implies c2 = (k+1,∞, k+6)T .
Obviously, since m = 3 6= −5, we know that c2 = (k +
1,∞, k + 6)T /∈ C
′
2, a contradiction.
(2) The case b = 3. It is not difficult to see that c3, c5 /∈ CS2 ,
which implies c3, c5 ∈ CT2 . Hence c3 = (k, k + 3,∞)T ,
c5 = (∞, k+3, k+6)T , and c2 = (∞,∞,∞)T , which implies
c4 = (k,∞, k + 6)T . Obviously, since m = 3 6= 1, we know
that c4 = (k,∞, k + 6)T /∈ C
′
2, a contradiction.
So, C′2 is a 2-SMIPPC(3, 92, 8).
Now, we deal with the case q = 14.
Lemma V.25. There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3, 287, 14).
Proof: We construct a (3, 287, 14) code C′3 on Z13
⋃
{∞}
as follows. Let
D3 =

 0 0 · · · 00 1 · · · 12
0 2 · · · 2× 12

 ,
S3 =

 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 5 6 9
3 6 9 2 5 1

 ,
T3 =

 ∞ 6 00 ∞ 4
7 0 ∞

 ,
CD3 = {c+ g | c ∈ D3, g ∈ Z13},
CS3 = {c+ g | c ∈ S3, g ∈ Z13},
CT3 = {c+ g | c ∈ T3, g ∈ Z13},
C3 = CD3
⋃
CS3 ,
C
′
3 = C3
⋃
CT3
⋃
{(∞,∞,∞)T }.
Let A1 = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9}, A2 = {2b | b ∈ A1}, and A3 =
{−3b | b ∈ A1}.
According to the proof of Lemma V.13, we know that
C3 is a 2-SMIPPC defined on Z13. Similar to the proof
of Theorem V.15, we can prove that C′3 is a 2-SC defined
on Z13
⋃
{∞} (see Appendix A). Now assume that C′3 is
not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem V.6, there exists
C0 = {c1, c2} = {(a1, b1, e1)T , (a2, b2, e2)T } ⊆ C
′
3, where
a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
3 is of
the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
⋂
C
′
3 =

 a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1

 ,
where c3 = (a1, b1, e2)T , c4 = (a1, b2, e1)T , c5 = (a2, b1,
e1)
T
.
(1) If c1 ∈ CD3 , then c1 = (k, k+ b, k+2b)T , where k, b ∈
Z13. Since CD3 has minimum distance 2, we have c3, c4, c5 /∈
CD3 .
(1.1) If b /∈ {4, 7, 10}, then c3, c4, c5 ∈ C3, and also c2 ∈
C3, which contradict to the fact that C3 is a 2-SMIPPC. So
this case is impossible.
(1.2) If b = 4, noting that −2b = 5 /∈ A3
⋃
{6}, we have
c4 /∈ CS3
⋃
CT3 , which implies c4 /∈ C
′
3, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
(1.3) If b = 7 or 10, noting that b /∈ A1
⋃
{4}, we have
c3 /∈ CS3
⋃
CT3 , which implies c3 /∈ C
′
3, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
(2) If c1 ∈ CS3 , then c1 = (k, k + b, k + 3b)T , where k ∈
Z13, b ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9}. We can check that c3, c4, c5 /∈ CT3 ,
which implies c3, c4, c5 ∈ C3 and also c2 ∈ C3. This is a
contradiction to the fact that C3 is a 2-SMIPPC. So this case
is impossible.
(3) c1 ∈ CT3 . If c1 = (∞, k, k + 7)T (or c1 = (k,∞, k −
6)T ), k ∈ Z13, then c3 = c1, a contradiction. Similarly, if
c1 = (k, k + 4,∞)T , k ∈ Z13, then c4 = c1, a contradiction.
So this case is impossible.
(4) If c1 = (∞,∞,∞)T , then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
According to (1)-(4), we know that c1 /∈ C′3, a contradiction.
So, C′3 is a 2-SMIPPC(3, 287, 14).
According to Theorem V.22, Lemmas V.23-V.25, and The-
orem V.4, we can derive the following result.
Theorem V.26. There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, q2 +
q(q−1)
2 , q) for any positive integer q ≡ 0, 2 (mod 6) > 2.
Finally, we can also construct an optimal binary 2-SMIPPC
of length 3.
Lemma V.27. There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3, 4, 2).
Proof: A 2-SMIPPC(3, 4, 2) is listed below:
C =

 0 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


In order to show that the code C above is optimal, we only
need to prove that there is no 2-SMIPPC(3,M, 2) with M ≥ 5.
Assume not. Suppose C′ is a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, 2) with M ≥ 5.
Noting that q = 2, we know that M ≤ 8. Choose arbitrary
5 codewords ci = (ai, bi, ei) ∈ C
′
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Then there
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must be two codewords ci and cj , 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 5, such that
d(ci, cj) = 3. We may assume that d(c1, c2) = 3, a1 = 0 and
a2 = 1. Hence desc({c1, c2}) = {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}.
Now, we are going to show that desc({c3, c4, c5}) =
{0, 1}×{0, 1}×{0, 1}. If a3 = a4 = a5 = 0, then {c1, c3, c4,
c5} = {(0, 0, 0)T , (0, 0, 1)T , (0, 1, 0)T , (0, 1, 1)T}. Hence
desc({(0, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 1)T}) =desc({(0, 0, 1)T , (0, 1, 0)T }),
while {(0, 0, 0)T , (0, 1, 1)T}
⋂
{(0, 0, 1)T , (0, 1, 0)T } = ∅, a
contradiction to the definition of a 2-SMIPPC. So, it is
impossible that a3 = a4 = a5 = 0. Similarly, it is impossible
that a3 = a4 = a5 = 1. This means that {a3, a4, a5} =
{0, 1}. Similarly, we can prove that {b3, b4, b5} = {0, 1}
and {e3, e4, e5} = {0, 1}. So, desc({c3, c4, c5}) =
{0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1}, which implies desc({c3, c4, c5}) =
desc({c1, c2}), while {c3, c4, c5}
⋂
{c1, c2} = ∅, a contradic-
tion to the definition of a 2-SMIPPC.
So, there does not exist a 2-SMIPPC(3,M, 2) with M ≥ 5.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we first introduced a new notion of an
SMIPPC for multimedia fingerprinting to resist the averaging
attack. We then showed that the tracing algorithm based on
a binary t-SMIPPC is more efficient than that of a binary t-
MIPPC. To be more precise, binary t-SMIPPCs can be used to
identify at least one colluder with computational complexity
linear to the product of the length of the code and the number
of authorized users. A composition construction for binary t-
SMIPPCs from q-ary t-SMIPPCs was presented, which makes
the research on q-ary t-SMIPPCs interesting. We also obtained
several infinite series of optimal t-SMIPPC(2,M, q)s with t =
2, 3. It is worth mentioning that optimal 2-SMIPPC(3,M, q)s
were constructed for each q ≡ 0, 1, 2, 5 (mod 6).
APPENDIX A
Theorem A.1. C′3 is a 2-SC(3, 287, 14)
Proof: According to Theorem V.10, we know that C3 =
CD3
⋃
CS3 is a 2-SC(3, 247, 13) defined on Z13. Hence,
|Ajg1
⋂
Ajg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive integers 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and
any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Z13 from Lemma V.2. Now we define
Bjg =


Ajg
⋃
{(∞, g − 6)T , (g + 4,∞)T }, if g ∈ Z13, j = 1
Ajg
⋃
{(∞, g + 7)T , (g − 4,∞)T }, if g ∈ Z13, j = 2
Ajg
⋃
{(∞, g − 7)T , (g + 6,∞)T }, if g ∈ Z13, j = 3
{(i, i+ 7)T |i ∈ Z13}
⋃
{(∞,∞)T }, if g =∞, j = 1
{(i+ 6, i)T |i ∈ Z13}
⋃
{(∞,∞)T }, if g =∞, j = 2
{(i, i+ 4)T |i ∈ Z13}
⋃
{(∞,∞)T }, if g =∞, j = 3
According to Lemma V.2, in order to prove that C′3 is a 2-SC,
it suffices to show that |Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 | ≤ 1 holds for any positive
integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Z13
⋃
{∞}.
For any distinct g1, g2 ∈ Z13, we have
{(∞, g1 − 6)
T
, (g1 + 4,∞)
T }
⋂
{(∞, g2 − 6)
T
, (g2 + 4,∞)
T } = ∅,
{(∞, g1 + 7)
T
, (g1 − 4,∞)
T }
⋂
{(∞, g2 + 7)
T
, (g2 − 4,∞)
T } = ∅,
{(∞, g1 − 7)
T
, (g1 + 6,∞)
T }
⋂
{(∞, g2 − 7)
T
, (g2 + 6,∞)
T } = ∅.
Then Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 = A
j
g1
⋂
Ajg2 for any integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3,
which implies |Bjg1
⋂
Bjg2 | ≤ 1. For any g ∈ Z13, we can also
have
B1g
⋂
B1∞ = {(g + 7, g + 1)
T },
B2g
⋂
B2∞ = {(g + 3, g − 3)
T },
B3g
⋂
B3∞ = {(g − 8, g − 4)
T }.
Then |Bjg
⋂
Bj∞| = 1 for any integer 1 ≤ j ≤ 3.
This completes the proof.
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